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TORTURING THE ROME STATUTE: THE ATTEMPT TO
BRING GUANTANAMO'S DETAINEES WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Eric Bales
I. INTRODUCTION*
On the campaign trail, Barack Obama promised to transfer detainees at
Guantanamo Bay into the United States and around the world1 as an alternativeS • 2
to prosecution by military commission. As President-elect, Barack Obama
cautioned the American public against a rushed and haphazard resolution, 3 but
anticipation mounted that he would begin dismantling the detention facilities
within his first week. By his third day in office President Obama instituted the
imminent closure of the detention facilities.5 This move was motivated in part
* General Attorney, Office of Associate Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
("CBP"), Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). J.D., 2008, Ave Maria School of Law;
B.A., 1998, Texas A&M University. This Article is the result of independent research and does
not represent the views of CBP, DHS or the United States; any opinions, errors, or omissions are
solely the responsibility of the author. I am indebted to Col. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., USMCR,
Commanding Officer, Legal Services Support Section, Marine Forces Reserve, for his masterful
tutelage in military law, national security law and international law as a Professor of Law at Ave
Maria School of Law and to Brian D. Eck, J.D., LL.M. for his insightful comments as this Article
was prepared for submission. Special thanks to James Olson, Senior Lecturer and Central
Intelligence Agency Officer-in-Residence at The George Bush School of Government, Texas
A&M University for his encouragement to "do more" and to my wife for her unending patience in
the pursuit of "doing more."
1. See Jay Solomon, US. Arranging to Send Prisoners to Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2009, at A7.
2. Julian E. Barnes & Peter Nicholas, Closure of Guantanamo Bay Could Turn Some
Detainees into U.S. Residents, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A14.
3. See All Things Considered, Trying Guantanamo Detainees May Pose Challenge, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Jan. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99361691.
4. All Things Considered, Where Do Detainees Go When Guantanamo Closes?, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Jan. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99311918.
5. Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2009, at A2; see also Ed Henry & Barbara Starr, Obama Plans Executive Order to Close
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by reports from an outgoing official of the Bush administration that at least one
detainee had been tortured. 6 Once it was confirmed that some of the detainees
would be brought to the United States 7 and that a number of former detainees
were returning to the jihad,8 public enthusiasm waned. So much so, President
Obama has opted to revise the Bush-era military commission system for
prosecuting detainees rather than reject the commissions. 9
Some suggest the United States ("U.S.") can divest itself of the politically
troublesome issue by transferring the detainees to the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") for prosecution. 10  That suggestion is a tortured reading of the
Rome Statute and a legal impossibility for several reasons. First, the ICC does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over terrorism. 11 Second, the ICC precludes
expanding its subject matter jurisdiction by analogy. 12 Third, only qualifying
crimes occurring after July 1, 2002 can be brought before the ICC, prohibiting
many of the detainees from appearing before the ICC. 13 Fourth, the U.S. is not a
state party to the Rome Statute that established the ICC. 14 Fifth, domestic law in
Guantanamo Bay, CNN.cOM, Jan. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.cnn.com/20O9/POLITICS/01/2 1/guantanamo.hearings/index.html.
6. U.S. Official Says Guantanamo Detainee Tortured: Report, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2009,
available at http://www.reuterscom/article/topNews/idUSTRE50D1E020090114; see also
Associated Press, Ex-State Dept. Lawyer Decries Torture at Gitmo: Former Counsel Says Bush
Administration Overreacted after 9/11, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29917234/
(last visited July 3, 2009).
7. Evan Perez, Holder Says Some Detainees May Be Released In U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2009, at A6.
8. Elisabeth Bumiller, 1 in 7 Detainees Rejoined Jihad, Pentagon Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2009, at Al.
9. William Glaberson, Changes Planned for Guantanamo Trials May Lead to Familiar
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at A14.
10. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International
Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (2003).
11. Press Release, U.N. Dept. of Pub. Information, International Criminal Court Fact Sheet
(Dec. 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/iccfact.htm (noting "In Rome, there was
significant interest in including terrorism . . . but it was decided not to do so .... At a future
review conference, if the States Parties so decide, the crime of terrorism could be added to the
Court's jurisdiction."); see also Mira Banchik, The International Criminal Court and Terrorism, 3
J. OF PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV. 18 (2003).
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. ,
13. Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 539, 543 (2007).
14. See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 989-91 (2008).
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the U.S. expressly forbids cooperation with the ICC. 15 Finally, the U.S. entered
into over 100 bilateral non-cooperation agreements with members of the
international community to curtail any exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. 16
Even if the Review Conference of the Rome Statute 17 revisits the issue of
terrorism and makes it an ICC core crime, this cannot overcome the fact that the
U.S. has yet to ratify the Rome Statute and U.S. domestic law expressly bars
participation in, or cooperation with, the ICC. Likewise, even if the United
States repeals its codified non-cooperation with the ICC, under the principal of
complementarity in the Rome Statute the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction
unless the United States cannot or will not prosecute a core crime under its own
national law. At the heart of this institutionalized non-cooperation with the
ICC, at least in the context of the global war on terrorism, is the fundamental
disagreement on what is "terrorism."
Part II of this Article surveys the oft-failed quest for a definition of
"terrorism." Measuring past attempts, a synthesized definition is proposed that
draws on the common ground of these otherwise divergent views. The
formation of the ICC is discussed in Part III while Part IV takes up the non-
inclusion of terrorism as a "core crime" of the ICC. 19 Also discussed in Part IV
is the attempt by some to shoe-horn terrorism into the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction as a crime against humanity; while creative, the argument is not
sustainable. Part V closes out the Article with a brief review of the American
Service-members' Protection Act of 2002 ("ASPA") and the "Article 98
agreements" that diminish the capacity of the ICC to fulfill its mandate. The
Article concludes that unless and until the Review Conference 20 amends the
15. American Service-members Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(7)
(Nov. 29, 1999), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-460 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-02, 7422-33
(2002)).
16. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 14, at 997-1004.
17. INT'L CRIM. CT., Compilation of Statements, Fourteenth Diplomatic Briefing of the
International Criminal Court, at 19 (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/90ED4AOB-029E-49BA-8AA2-
9DA59BE3EB09/279061/ICCDB14STENGFRA1 .pdf.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 1.
19. Susana SaCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal
Court, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 807, 808 (2008) (granting subject matter jurisdiction over
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression); see generally Keith
A. Petty, Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of Aggression for the International Criminal
Court, 31 HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 531 (2008) (noting the crime of aggression has yet to
be defined and is therefore not enforced).
20. INT'L CRIM. CT., supra note 17.
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Rome Statute to include terrorism as an ICC core crime 21 and the U.S. removes
the obstacles it laid in the path of the ICC, there is no super-national body with
jurisdiction to which the United States can pass off its legal burdens.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DEFINITIONS
A continuing obstacle to international cooperation in the prosecution of
terrorism is the fundamental disagreement on what is "terrorism. '' 2 The United
Nations ("U.N.") has yet to reach a consensus, which is often attributed to the
"politically charged nature of terrorist activity" and disagreement on whether
there should be an exemption for "national liberation movements." 23  As it
stands, the U.N. has yet to proffer an official definition of terrorism and has been
equally unwilling to designate the systematic attacks of,roups like Al Qaida as
"acts of war" or part of an "international armed conflict 2
A. The United Nations Draft Definition
In all fairness, in 2001, negotiations within the U.N. over the draft
Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism produced a tentative definition for
terrorism.25  An improvement over past stalemates, the draft definition
nevertheless rings hollow because it clings to the continued disagreement over
whether terrorism includes violence against civilians and whether or not to
exempt "freedom fighters."'26 Given the divergent perspectives of U.N. member
states, it is unlikely these disagreements will soon be resolved. 27  Still, the
aspects upon which U.N. measures agree provide a starting point. Thankfully,
most member states have a strong understanding of what constitutes terrorism
21. Press Release, U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Conference by Chairman of Working
Group on Crime of Aggression (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/07013 _Wenaweser.doc.htm.
22. Vincent-Jod1 Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the
Post-September I I th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM.
U. INT'LL. REV. 1009, 1033 (2004).
23. LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
DEVELOPMENTS IN CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 192-93, 201 (1997).
24. JACKSON N. MAOGOTO, BATTLING TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF FORCE
AND THE WAR ON TERROR 184 (2005) (noting adherence by some U.N. members to use of
terrorism); see also HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 49 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
1995) (defining act of war).
25. Christian Much, The International Criminal Court (1CC) and Terrorism as an International
Crime, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 129 (2006).
26. Id. at 130.
27. After the murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics, the Secretary General of the U.N.
added prevention of terrorism to the General Assembly's agenda; a firestorm of debate followed,
making it clear that many states regard terrorism as a legitimate option. MAOGOTO, supra note 24,
at 184-85.
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and have formed a strong consensus, aligning against specific manifestations of
terrorism.
28
B. Emerging Trend in International Perspectives
There are three barometers for measuring contemporary international
perspectives on a terrorism definition. Two of them, ironically, rest with the
U.N. nomenclature. Those barometers are: treaty law (promulgated primarily
through the U.N.), Security Council resolutions, and scholarly commentaries on
international law.
29
1. Treaty Law
Treaties among the international community tend to illuminate prevailing
opinions on any given subject. The League of Nations, the precursor to the
U.N., put forth one of the first concerted efforts to define "terrorism" in treaty
law, opining it to be those "criminal acts directed against a state and intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group
of persons or the general public."' 30  Though the League of Nations failed to
achieve ratification of this definition, the U.N. has fielded several on-point
treaties that largely incorporate the League of Nations template. 3 1 For all these
initiatives, however, the U.N. has never officially and unequivocally defined
terrorism. 32 Instead, the U.N. response has been reactive, adopting measures
that encourage member states to prohibit specific acts in their own municipal
laws.
33
The closest a U.N. treaty has come to defining terrorism was the General
Assembly's adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. 34  The Convention identifies a covered offense as
"act[s] intend[ing] to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian.., when
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
28. Most western countries have a strong understanding of the unlawful character of terrorism.
See CODE PENAL art. 421-1 (Fr.); see also Terrorism Act 2000, 2000, c. 11, pt. 1(1) (U.K.).
International conventions on the other hand focus on specific manifestations rather than terrorism
as a whole. See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14,1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
29. Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court: Possibilities
andProblems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2002).
30. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism art. I 2, 19 League of
Nations O.J. 23 (1938).
31. See Martinez, supra note 29, at 5.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5-13.
34. Virginia Morris & Arnold Pronto, Current Development: The Work of the Sixth Committee
at the Fifty-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 582, 585
(2000).
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to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act."'35 This is excellent progress, but the Convention does not create
an international crime of terrorism, let alone an international tribunal with
appropriate jurisdiction. The General Assembly has, at least, rejected the
"political acts" defense of terrorism.36 However terrorism is defined in the eyes
of the General Assembly, we now have a sense of what it is not.
2. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Another indicator of international sentiment is the abundance of Security
Council resolutions. The Security Council has adopted numerous resolutions
condemning specific manifestations of terrorism-but has not defined terrorism.
Examples include Resolutions 635, 731, 1368 and 1373. 37 Resolution 635 calls
for international cooperation in preventing terrorist use of plastic explosives.
38
Resolution 731 describes the downing of Pan Am Flight No. 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland as a "terrorist attack." 39  Resolutions 1368 and 1373
describe the events of September 11 as "terrorism." The attacks in Mumbai,
though not rating a resolution, were condemned by way of a press release.
41
Though the Security Council has not provided the world with a working
definition, its resolutions at least provide a sense of what terrorism looks like in
the eyes of the U.N.
3. Scholastic Commentaries
There are many views in academia that populate the field with potential
definitions of terrorism. These legal commentaries are no less diverse than the
makeup of the international community itself. Representative examples of the
divergence found among legal commentators include:
Lyal S. Sunga, Senior Lecturer, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, Sweden-
[A]cts of terror frequently involve the premeditated use or threat of violence
calculated to create a climate of fear with a view to provoking the [g]overnment
35. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109,
at 3, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999).
36. G.A. Res. 49/60 4, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A49/743 (Dec. 9,
1994).
37. Martinez, supra note 29, at 7-8.
38. S.C. Res. 635, U.N. Doc. S/RES/635 (June 14, 1989).
39. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
40. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also S.C. Res. 1368, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
41. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in
Mumbai, U.N. Doc. SC/9513 (Nov. 28, 2008).
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into overreaction, or to intimidate the [g]overnment or a section of the
population into changing a particular policy or course of action.
42
Alex P. Schmid, Chair of International Relations, St. Andrews University,
Scotland-
Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims
serve as an instrumental target of violence .... Through previous use of
violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class
are put in a state of chronic fear (terror) .... The victimization. .. is
considered extranormal by most observers ... on the basis of its atrocity, the
time (e.g. peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard
for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare .... 43
Michael J. Kelly, Assistant Professor of Law, Creighton University, United
States of America-
"Terrorism" may be defined as the commission of various violent illegal
"acts, which physically or mentally harm the well being of an individual or
group of people with the aims of promoting of a political or religious
ideology."4
Though these efforts at a definition among academia are as varied as the
state-sponsored attempts, common elements can nevertheless be discerned.
C. Synthesized Definition of Terrorism
The consistent stumbling block for a common definition of terrorism is
summed up best by the hackneyed adage, "one man's terrorist is another man's
freedom fighter."45 This is underscored by two items that often ensnare any
attempt to define terrorism: "the targeting of civilians and the existence of an
ideological or political purpose" to the violence. 46  The former evokes
significant debate on the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants.
That is, whether protections should be granted to those who violate the Geneva
Conventions' definition of a lawful combatant. 47 The latter element, motive,
42. SUNGA, supra note 23, at 191.
43. ALEX P. SCHMID, A.J. JONGMAN & MICHAEL STOHL, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE
TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA BASES, THEORIES AND LITERATURE 1-2 (2d ed. 1988).
44. Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491,
508 n.94 (2003); see also Hanz Chiappetta, Rome 11/15/1998: Extradition or Political Asylum for
the Kurdistan Workers Party's Leader Abdullah Ocalan?, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 117, 130-31
(2001).
45. Thomas H. Mitchell, Defining the Problem, in DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 9 (David A. Charters ed., 1991); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of
International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 101 (2002)
(noting the phrase to be, "What is terrorism to some is heroism to others ... )
46. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1034.
47. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(2), Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] (noting lawful combatants are
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moves beyond the mens rea normally focused upon in criminal prosecutions by
trying to understand the purpose of the act.
48
Still, a synthesized definition drawing on the parallel threads of each is
possible. As introduced by Susan Tiefenbrun, five common elements can be
drawn from the emerging consensus against terrorism. 49 The first element is the
use or threat of violence.50  Second, the violence (proposed or actual) is
indiscriminate in that the targets are not the chief end. Third, the targeting of
civilians is intentional.52  Fourth, the purpose of the violence is coercion.
5 3
Fifth, the coercion is aimed to compel or dissuade a particular act.54 Adopting
these five elements to inform our discussion, this Article now turns to
international attempts to respond to terrorism as a criminal act.
III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A WORK IN PROGRESS SINCE 1919
Established on July 1, 2002, 55 the ICC realized the long-standing goal of
the international community to form a standing court56 that built upon the
momentum of the tribunals of Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and Rwanda by
establishing a permanent forum to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes.57 While the ICC enjoys broad jurisdiction, it does not possess
universal jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is limited to the most serious offenses
("core crimes") 58 occurring within the territory of a state party, committed by a
those members of armed forces, militias or organized resistance groups that wear fixed, distinctive
emblems/uniforms recognizable from a distance, openly carry arms, follow an established chain-
of-command and conduct all "operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war"). Some
members of the General Assembly of the U.N. struggle to distinguish between terrorism and the
"legitimate struggle of an occupied people for liberation." Aaron J. Noteboom, Terrorism: I Know
It When ISee It, 81 OR. L. REv. 553, 565 (2002).
48. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1034-35.
49. Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA INT'L &
COMP. L. 357, 360-61 (2003).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2002, at A3.
56. Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A
Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom", 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 19, 21 (2003); see
also INT'L CRIM. CT., ABOUT THE COURT, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/
(last visited April 29, 2009).
57. Chibueze, supra note 56, at 19-20; see generally Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7.
58. SaCouto & Cleary, supra note 19, at 816.
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citizen of a state party or where a state is not party to the Rome Statute but grants
ad hoc jurisdiction to the ICC. 59
A. Historical Background
For perhaps the first time, prosecution of individuals for war crimes was
proposed following World War I at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.60 This
was rejected because the prevailing view was that compliance with the laws of
war was the responsibility of the State, not individuals. The U.S. rejected any
attempt to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm because it viewed prosecutions of a head of
state as an attack against that nation's sovereignty. 62 Ultimately, no trials were
held but so began a charge that picked up momentum under the League of
Nations and later the U.N., dulling resistance to the notion of individual
responsibility.
63
The outrages of the First World War paled in comparison to the atrocities
discovered after World War II. 64  In response, France and the United States
zealously advocated for tribunals to prosecute war crimes that could serve as a
deterrent to any future transgressor. The Nuremberg Charter and the result of
that advocacy articulated the emerging concept of individual criminal liability
for the conduct of war.
66
However, the Nuremberg tribunal was not a complete innovation. The
Nuremberg Charter drew extensively on the Preamble of the Hague Convention
IV, which refers to "the interests of humanity and the ever-progressive needs of
civilization."'6 7 Paragraph eight of the Preamble went further, stating that "the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and [governance] of
the principles of the law of nations [, derived] from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public
conscience."'6 8 The legacy of Nuremberg is the establishment of fairness and
due process in international tribunals and the definitive idea that individual
59. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 12.
60. Regina Horton, The Long Road to Hypocrisy: The United States and the International
Criminal Court, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2003).
61. See Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
62. Horton, supra note 60, at 1043 (citing Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International
Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1998)).
63. Horton, supra note 60, at 1044.
64. Id. at 1045.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATOR 76 (2000)).
67. Hague Convention IV, supra note 61, 2.
68. Id. 8 (alteration to original).
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criminal liability exists for the commission of war crimes-an "act of state"
cannot serve as a defense.
69
The Nuremberg Charter did not speak of terrorism. Instead, "crimes against
peace" and "war crimes" were the backdrop upon which crimes against
humanity might occur.70  And for this reason terrorism has no organic basis
within the legacy of the Nuremberg Charter to become part of the ICC's core
crime jurisdiction as a crime against humanity.7 1
B. Shifting Attitudes: From Nuremberg to the Rome Statutes
The League of Nations advocated a standing international criminal court at
the same time it proposed its definition of terrorism in 1937, but this too failed.
72
The U.N. picked up where the League of Nations left off,73 but the ICC was not
immediately accepted. Then came the events of Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
impressing upon the world the need for a standing international court.
74
Just as September 11 was a catalyst for rapid reform of municipal laws in
the U.S., the horrors of Yugoslavia and Rwanda motivated the international
community to no longer sit idly by. The Statute adopted for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") 75 established ad hoc
jurisdiction over individuals who had committed specific acts amid the armed
conflict (international or not) and directed against the civilian population.76 The
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") 77
incorporates the same enumerations as the ICTY, but diverges in two significant
ways. First, it abandons the requirement of the violations occurring during an
armed conflict.78  Second, it adds the element of discriminatory intent.
79
69. See John M. Czametzsky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the
International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 72 n.61 (2003) (noting Nuremberg
declared that genocide and mass murder are immitigable evils, and constitute independent crimes
against humanity).
70. Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. YBK. INT'L L. 178, 206 (1946).
71. Id. at 180.
72. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Nov. 16, 1937, 19 League
of Nations O.J. 37 (1938) (never entered into force).
73. Horton, supra note 60, at 1046.
74. MARLIES GLASIUs, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
ACHIEVEMENT 11 (2006).
75. U.N. Security Council, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex and S/25704/Add. 1 (May
25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
76. Id. art. 5.
77. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
78. KRIANGSAK KITrICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 89 (2001); See generally
ICTR Statute, supra note 77.
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Specifically, civilian victims were targeted on the basis of national, racial, ethnic
or religious identity.
80
Before the ICTY and ICTR tribunals were erected, hearings by individual
states in their national courts advanced the cause of universal jurisdiction over
the most heinous crimes.81 Borrowing from the universal jurisdiction principle
of Nuremberg, the Eichmann (1961), Barbie (1985) and Touvier (1994) cases
against Nazi war crimes solidified the foundation upon which the ICTY and
ICTR jurisdiction would later be built. In turn, the facts confronted by the ICTY
and the ICTR tribunals became the catalyst that ushered the ICC into existence.
82
C. The Rome Statute: Negotiating the Scope of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute brought with it broad jurisdiction, but not the universal
jurisdiction of its predecessors. 8 3 Nevertheless, teeth were finally put into the
international law maxim "aut dedere aut judicare" (extradite or prosecute).
However, some view the ICC as an entity that could become dangerous from its
lack of moral and political checks.
84
For its part, the U.S. used its role at the Rome Conference to increase
safeguards and curtail the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised by the ICC. s5
The view of the U.S. under President Clinton was that the draft statute
overreached as an international treaty and improerly sought to bind non-party
states, contrary to the norms of international law.P6 That is, treaties may7 neither
impose obligations upon, nor modify the legal rights of, non-signatories.
79. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1056.
80. ICTR Statute, supra note 77, art. 3.
81. See, e.g., Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. Jer. 1961) (Israeli prosecution
of a former Nazi officer for his role in committing atrocities against Jews); F~dration Nationale
des Ddportds et Internis R6sistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125 (Fr. 1985)
(French prosecution of a former Gestapo superior for the deportation and execution of Jews);
Touvier Judgment of 20 April 1994, Cour d'Assises of Versailles (prosecution by France of a
senior member of Lyons' militia, part of the Vichy forces, fifty years after-the-fact for complicity
in crimes against humanity).
82. See generally Greg Steinmetz, A Daughter-in-Law of 'Old Blue Eyes' Takes a Tough Case,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 1999, at Al.
83. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 12.
84. Czametzsky & Rychlak, supra note 69, at 59.
85. Chibueze, supra note 56, at 31. The United States demanded numerous safe guards during
the Rome Conference but ultimately voted against the Rome Statute. Id. at 21. President Clinton
nevertheless signed it in his last days in office, but the Senate never ratified it and President Bush
subsequently withdrew the U.S. as a signatory. Id. at 21-22.
86. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 12, 18 (1999).
87. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26 (2001) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
2009]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
While it is true obligations cannot be imposed upon a state without its
consent, it is a different matter entirely that criminal liability can attach over a
non-party's citizens whose conduct occurs within the territory of a contracting
party. This is not the creation of obligations for non-party states and it cannot be
argued that an exercise of jurisdiction within the territory of a contracting state
party is an "overreach."' 88 Nevertheless, the U.S. delegation actively resisted
universal jurisdiction, pressing for personal jurisdiction only by consent or by
Security Council referral. Universal jurisdiction failed, but so did the measures
proposed by the U.S. 89 The conference literally came down to a take-it-or-leave-
it package presented on the evening of the last day. 90 Last minute maneuvers by
the U.S. and India to derail the conference were unsuccessful; the final vote was
taken with only two hours to spare: 120 yeas, 7 neas and 21 abstentions.
9 1
Quickly reaching its minimum sixty ratifications, 92 the ICC became
operative July 1, 2002.93  Efforts to carve exceptions for "official acts" (for
example, military personnel on U.N. peace keeping missions) were rebuffed. 94
In the end, the ICC achieved broad personal jurisdiction: whenever the location
of an incident or the nationality of an accused was a signatory to the Rome
Statute or when a non-party state ceded jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.95
Though President Bill Clinton inexplicably signed the Rome Statute after
steadfastly resisting it, Congress never ratified the Rome Statute. 96  Leaving
nothing to chance, President George W. Bush "unsigned" the Rome Statute9 7
and Congress enacted the American Service-member Protection Act of 2002. It
has been suggested that President Barack Obama may revisit the U.S.' position
on the Rome Statute. 98 Even if that proves to be the case, Congress still must
repeal the ASPA and resolve the multitude of Article 98 agreements the U.S. put
in place to eviscerate ICC jurisdiction before any effective change could be
realized.
99
88. Chibueze, supra note 56, at 34 (citing Rome Statute, art. 12).
89. GLASIUS, supra note 74, at 134-35.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id.
92. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 126(1) (granting effectiveness sixty days after the sixtieth
ratification by a Contracting State).
93. Simons, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 73.
95. Id. at 16-17.
96. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 14, at 990.
97. Id. at 991.
98. See id. at 984-85.
99. See generally id. at 997-1004 (an "Article 98 agreement" is a bilateral agreement with
another nation to purposefully not cooperate with the ICC.).
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IV. AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF TERRORISM?
The ICC does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over terrorism. The
two recurring disputes that plague negotiations of a common definition of
terrorism-use of force against civilians and whether to exempt "freedom
fighters"-provediust as fatal to inclusion of terrorism as a core crime in the
Rome Statutes. Some commentators nevertheless argue the express
foreclosure does not absolutely bar prosecution of terrorist acts by the ICC. 101
That is, a demonstrable campaign of terrorism 102 is argued to fall within the
ICC's "crimes against humanity" jurisdiction. 10 3 Though persuasively argued,
there are numerous obstacles to such an exercise of ICC jurisdiction. 104
100. Much, supra note 25, at 130.
101. Martinez, supra note 29, at 1-2; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 10; William A. Schabas,
Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
907, 925 (2003).
102. Al Qaeda has pursued a sustained effort against the U.S. In 1993, al Qaeda detonated a
bomb in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center. Federal Bureau of
Investigations, Rewards for Justice, http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page--wt
(last visited July 16, 2009). Later in 1993, U.S. armed forces operating in Somalia suffered
eighteen fatalities and seventy-three injuries from tactics used against them, which were taught by
al Qaeda during the infamous "Black Hawk Down" mission. Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorists Attacks,
The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks
Upon the United States, Official Government Edition 130 (2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 l/pdf/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter 9/JlComm 'n Report]. Separate plots
to assassinate President Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul II were thwarted in 1994 and 1995. Id. at
147. Operation Bonjinka, the detonation of bombs aboard eleven overseas flights and a planned
Kamikaze flight into Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia, were also
disrupted. See CNN.com, Philippines: U.S. missed 9/11 clues years ago (Jul. 26, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/07/26/khalid.confession/index.html (last
visited May 7, 2009). In 1996, a vehicle bomb was detonated near the Khobar Towers housing
complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press Release (Jun. 21,
2001). On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda orchestrated simultaneous bombings against U.S. Embassies
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. See 9-11 Comm'n Report, at 149. On December
14, 1999, an al Qaeda operative attempted to enter board the Port Angeles, Washington ferry with
an explosives-laden vehicle, destined for Los Angeles International Airport. Id. at 177-79. On
January 3, 2000, an attempt was made by al Qaeda to attack the U.S.S. The Sullivans while at port
in Aden, Yemen. Id. at 180. The small boat used in the attempt was overloaded with explosives
and sank while en route to the warship. Id. Terrorists salvaged the explosives and completed a
successful strike against the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000. Id. at 190. On September 11, 2001,
four commercial airliners were hijacked and used as improvised weapons against targets inside the
U.S. Id.
103. Martinez, supra note 29, at 1-2; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 10.
104. Martinez, supra note 29, at 2.
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A. Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity?
It is an erroneous argument that terrorism can be prosecuted before the ICC
as a crime against humanity. 105 True, the elements of the synthesized definition
proposed in Part I match up to those in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.10 6 And
yes, there are a number of instances where recourse to the ICC would be helpful.
But in the end, the Rome Statute itself precludes expansive interpretations of the
ICC's subject matter jurisdiction.10 7
1. Rome Statute, Art. 7: Crimes Against Humanity
One of four "core crimes" established under the Rome Statute, "crimes
against humanity"' 108 was first expressly recognized in international law by the
St. Petersburg Declaration in 1868.109 Accordingly, the acceptance of ICC
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity has never been seriously contested, but
the list of enumerated crimes coming under the designation is another matter.
110
Article 7 of the Rome Statute identifies crimes against humanity as: "[A]cts ...
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." Specifically, Article 7 lists
eleven underlying criminal acts: murder; extermination; enslavement;
deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law; torture; sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution; enforced
disappearances; apartheid; and other inhumane acts of a similar character."
11
What is most distinguishing about the Rome Statute's formulation from the
traditional understanding of crimes against humanity is the removal of the
requirement that an offense occur during an armed conflict. 112 The delegates of
the Rome Conference recognized that the illegality is every bit as real during
times of "peace" as it is during times of war.
113
105. Contra Roy S. Lee, How the World Will Relate to the Court: An Assessment of the ICC
Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 756 (2002).
106. Compare Tiefenbrun, supra note 49, at 361 (outlining the synthesized definition of
terrorism) with Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1) (noting that the five elements of crimes
against humanity in Article 7(1) are: an attack; nexus between crimes and attack; committed
against a civilian population; on a widespread or systematic basis; pursuant to a plan or policy).
107. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
108. Id. art. 5(b).
109. MACHTELD BOOT et al., Article 7-Crimes Against Humanity, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 121-22 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
110. BOOT, supra note 109, at 101.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(a)-(k).
112. Martinez, supra note 29, at 27.
113. BOOT, supra note 109, at 123, 125.
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2. Repackaging Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity
Not unpersuasively, a creative argument has been advanced that suggests
acts of terrorism are prosecutable before the ICC as a crime against humanity. 114
In fact, five of the eleven enumerated acts qualifying as a crime against humanity
are especially applicable to the terrorism context: murder, torture, persecution,
forced disappearances and "other inhumane acts." 115 Murder, the illegal killing
of another person, is most often the short-term aim of contemporary terrorist
attacks. 1 16  Torture is the "intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person within the care, custody, or control of
the perpetrator." 117  Persecution is "the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights [of an identifiable group (political, racial, cultural, ethnic,
religious or sex)] contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group."" 8 Enforced disappearances are those occurring "with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State... followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the
activity in order that the person can be removed] from protection of the law."' 119
"Other inhumane acts [is a catch-all that speaks to acts] causing great suffering,
or serious [bodily] injury [short of death]." 12
Advocates of shoe-homing terrorism into the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction are absolutely correct that international condemnation lends itself to
the use of the ICC in this fashion. And these advocates correctly point to the
general agreement among the nations on the essential elements and universal
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, as evidenced by the holdings of the
High Court of Australia 12 1 and other national courts. 122  The Rome Statute,
however, does not permit itself to be twisted by analogy to read in such a
fashion. 123 Even if this were not so, under the principle of complementarity the
114. See generally Proulx, supra note 22, at 1010.
115. Martinez, supra note 29, at 31.
116. See Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe
of Mumbai Siege, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 2009, at Al.
117. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(2)(e).
118. Id. art. 7(2)(g).
119. Id. art. 7(2)(i).
120. Id. art. 7(1)(k). Examples include the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo and the acid-throwing
campaign against Islamic women not wearing the traditional veil. David P. Fidler, Public Health
and International Law: Bioterrorism, Public Health and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 7, 9
(2002); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 25, 2002, at 52-76.
121. Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, 14 L.R.T.W.C. 89, 109 (1949) (stating trials of war crimes
fulfilled a duty not only to national justice but also to all the nations).
122. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding revocation of
naturalization of defendant as U.S. citizen was valid and that Israel could extradite and prosecute
defendant on principle of universal jurisdiction). There is also the matter of the attempted
prosecution of Pinochet by Spain. See Czarnetzsky & Rychlak, supra note 69, at 73-77.
123. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
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ICC is a court of last resort-a fact reluctantly acknowledged by the advocates
of interpretational elasticity. 1
24
B. Why Terrorism Is Not a Crime Against Humanity
The attempt to make an end run around the ICC's limited jurisdiction falls
flat for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Article 22 of the Rome
Statute. Article 22 expressly forecloses manipulations: "[t]he definition of a
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In the
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted."' 25 Thus, application of this "core
crime" cannot include resort to the ICC for terrorism prosecutions, even though
the acts to be prohibited are "non-derogable norms of the major human rights
treaties" and "norms of customary international law."'
126
The non-inclusion of terrorism is more than a silent omission. The
"legislative history" of the Rome Statute expressly forecloses terrorism as a core
crime 12 7 and has been reiterated on record by the U.N. 128  There are eight
overlapping factors that led to refusing to include terrorism as a core crime:
the "core crimes" ultimately included were those of the greatest concern to
the international community;
the core crimes enjoyed clear status under customary international law;
inclusion of other crimes would impede acceptance of the Rome Statute;
prevailing view that effective systems of international cooperation were
already in place for "treaty crimes";
a desire to avoid overburdening the ICC;
the lack of a generally accepted definition of "terrorism";
concern that a "crime of terrorism" might politicize the 1CC; and
hope that limiting the ICC's jurisdiction would facilitate a coherent and
unified approach to its exercise of jurisdiction and the required stateS129
cooperation.
Professor Christian Much offers a more focused take, keying on factors
one, six and seven: the offense is not well defined; the ICC mission is to try the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community; and the
politicizing effect on the court. 130  Whatever the cause for non-inclusion,
terrorism is not a core crime and cannot creatively be dressed up as a crime
124. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1013; see also Kirsch, supra note 13, at 543.
125. Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 22(2).
126. Schabas, supra note 101, at 916, 925.
127. See GLASIUS, supra note 74, at 1-18.
128. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, supra note 11.
129. BOOT, supra note 109, at 98-99.
130. See generally, Much, supra note 25.
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against humanity, however appealing the ICC is as a forum for trying terrorist
detainees.
C. Advantages of International Criminal Court Jurisdiction
Though the attempt to shoe-horn terrorism into the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction is doomed to fail, there are at least five distinct advantages to
granting jurisdiction. The first advantage would be defusing judicial impasses
between two governments that begin to threaten economic reprisals. 13 1  The
second advantage is to provide an alternative to a detaining state that hesitates to
extradite out of concern for human rights violations that might occur against the
detainees in the receiving country. 132 A third advantage of resort to the ICC is
the elimination of the "need" of extraordinary renditions to bring suspects within
the reach of municipal law for prosecution in a nation's domestic courts. 133 The
fourth advantage of ICC jurisdiction is to maintain the possibility of prosecuting
rebel groups that illegitimately come to power through means constituting
terrorism, in that it is improbable the national judiciary, if it remains, would be
inclined to entertain a prosecution. 134 Finally, where the U.N. Security Council
proves to be a politically-hostile environment, referral to the ICC could
constitute a relief valve for an impartial finding of facts and disposition. 1
35
For purposes of the Obama administration, the inclusion of terrorism within
the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction would afford not only the aforementioned
advantages, its inclusion would create a politically expedient solution to the
dilemma inherited from the Bush administration. Despite these advantages, the
Rome Statute as it is currently drafted does not allow for an exercise of
jurisdiction over terrorism. As discussed, however, the Rome Statute Review
Conference could change that.
131. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1014-15 (referencing Libya's refusal to extradite the Lockerbie
bombing suspects).
132. Id. at 1016. As a signatory to the Convention Against Torture, the U.S. is obligated to
refuse extraditions and deportations where there is a credible threat of torture or other human right
violations of the person to be removed form the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. G.A. Res.
39/46 U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10 1984) [hereinafter C.A.T.] Of course, C.A.T. arguably
precludes most extraordinary renditions, but that is beyond the scope of this article.
133. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1017. This was the case in United States v. Tunis, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991) where the defendant was lured onto a yacht by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations and arrested upon entering international waters.
134. Id. This scenario would trigger jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity because
of the inability of a nation to prosecute; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 17.
135. Proulx, supra note 22, at 1017 (citing Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some
Crucial Legal Categories ofInternational Law, 12 EURO. J. INT'L L. 993, 994 (2001)).
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V. UNITED STATES AVERSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Even after opting out of the Rome Statute, concern over the perceived
dangers of politicized prosecutions lingered. In response, Congress enacted to
the American Service-members' Protection Act of 2002. The ASPA prohibits,
inter alia, U.S. membership in the ICC, 136 extradition of any U.S. citizen to the
ICC, 137 transfer of classified intelligence to the ICC, 138 or military assistance to
countries who are signatories to the ICC. 139  The ASPA also authorizes the
President of the United States to utilize "all means necessary and appropriate" to
liberate U.S. and allied personnel detained by, on behalf of, or at the request of
the ICC. 140 With article 98 of the Rome Statute in mind, the U.S. has
aggressively pursued bilateral agreements with other nations to memorialize
formal non-cooperation with the ICC. 14 1  Acting under the ASPA, the U.S.
began withdrawing foreign aid and military assistance in 2003 from countries
refusing to enter into Article 98 agreements. 142 To date, the United States has
negotiated over 100 Article 98 non-surrender agreements with other nations. 
14 3
Thus, even if the ICC enjoyed subject matter jurisdiction over terrorism-
by amendment or creative interpretation-the U.S. is not party to the Rome
Statute and remains statutorily precluded from cooperation with the ICC by its
own municipal law. Whether President Obama re-signs the Rome Statute,
nullifies all Article 98 agreements and Congress fully repeals the ASPA remains
to be seen. If the U.S. moves beyond its aversion to the ICC, the Review
Conference must still declare terrorism a core crime within its jurisdiction before
President Obama begins booking rooms at The Hague for the Guantanamo
detainees.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2002).
137. 22 U.S.C. § 7402 (2002).
138. 22 U.S.C. § 7425 (2002).
139. 22 U.S.C. § 7426 (repealed 2008).
140. 22 U.S.C. § 7427 (2002); see also Chibueze, supra note 56, at 22 (noting the ASPA has
been coined as the "Hague Invasion Act" by the international community because it authorizes the
use of force against the ICC and/or its agents in order to liberate detained U.S. personnel).
141. GLASIUS, supra note 74, at 20. See also Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 98 (allowing a
country to refuse to extradite an accused person to the ICC when doing so would violate its own
treaties).
142. GLASIUS, supra note 74, at 20; 22 U.S.C. § 7426 (repealed 2008) (withdrawing of military
assistance is required by the ASPA).
143. Press release, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3,
2005), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (noting the Department
of State has not indicated any additional Article 98 Agreements since 2005); U.S. Department of
State, Article 98 Agreements and the International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/art98/index.htm.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the cause for not including terrorism as a core crime, 144 legal
gymnastics cannot bring a terrorism charge before the ICC. Until and unless the
Review Conference 14 5 amends the Rome Statute the question is foreclosed. For
that matter, until the U.S. Congress repeals the ASPA the U.S. cannot cooperate
in any way, shape or form with the ICC. But even if these obstacles are
overcome, Philippe Kirsch, President of the ICC, reminds us that only those core
crimes committed after July 1, 2002 are eligible. 14 6  Thus, come what
amendments may to the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, the next stop for most
detainees at Guantanamo Bay is not The Hague.
147
144. It appears to be not so much an inability to define terrorism that plagues the U.N. as it is an
unwillingness to do so. This is the same international community that awarded the leader of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO"), Yasser Arafat, the Nobel Peace Prize,
Nobelprize.org, Nobel Laureates 1994, http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/lists/1994.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009), and granted diplomatic relations with the PLO as it perfected air piracy.
See D.A. Valentine, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802, 806 n.27 (1980) (discussing the
U.N. grant of observer status to the PLO as a "national liberation movement" on November 22,
1974). There were discussions in the early 2000s that Arafat's prize could and should be
rescinded. E.g. Morton Kondrake, Arafat's Legacy: Culture of Suicide, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 21,
2004, at G5, available at
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?no=subj&articleid=04112 lSyG5 Arafa5167&arc
hive=yes. The United States Congress formally declared the PLO a foreign terrorist organization
in 1987. Pub. L. 100-204, Title X, § 1002(b), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1406, 1407 (codified as the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201 to 5205). The basis of this declaration includes
the PLO's involvement in the Achille Lauro episode, the 1973 assassination of U.S. Ambassador
Cleo Noel Jr. in Khartoum, Sudan, and multiple murders of U.S. citizens overseas. Id. § 1002(a),
101 Stat. at 1407.
145. Press Release, Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression (Jan. 31, 2007),
available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070131 _Wenaweser.doc.htm. The
focus of the Review Conference, however, will be defining "Crime of Aggression," a recognized
but not-yet-defined core crime. Press Release, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc L/3129 (June 6, 2008) available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/L3129.doc.htm.
146. Kirsch, supra note 13, at 543.
147. The most likely outcome will be the use of Article III Courts within the United States rather
than the military commissions, something U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder emphatically
endorsed during his confirmation hearings. Eric Lichtblau, Holder Wants Some Detainees Tried in
the US., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2009). Of course, one alternative that could be taken up is the use of
admiralty law to prosecute at least a portion of the terrorist menace. E.g. Douglas R. Burgess, Jr.,
The Dread Pirate Bin Laden: How Thinking of Terrorists as Pirates Can Help Win the War on
Terror, LEGAL AFF. (July-Aug. 2005).
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